HomeBritish trade restraints and peace prospectsPagina 5

JPEG (Deze pagina), 763.45 KB

TIFF (Deze pagina), 6.96 MB

PDF (Volledig document), 10.63 MB

1 l
G sense. The question of effectiveness is a question
of fact, rather than of law. I do not think that any
serious charge can be made that the British blockade
has not been effective, because never has British
control of the seas been so complete as at the present
There are also other requisites. There must be
due notice. This, I think, has been given in the
l Orders in Council of March 11th, 1915, whieh, though
they did not use the Word " blockade " and did
j provide measures short of conüscation of the cargoes
i and of the vessels attempting to carry goods to
C Germany, nevertheless were interpreted by the
l British Government as in effect a blockade.
The main eritieism, however, made by the German
’ Government is that the British blockade really
blockades neutral ports, in that goods going through
Holland or Scandinavia are taken on the ground that
they are going to an enemy destination, that is to
say Germany, a blockaded country.
, There has been a great deal of discussion and refine-
, ment in regard to this matter and lawyers have
, ' differed radically thereon.
ë It is perfectly true that neutral ports may not be
‘ blockaded. On the other hand the Anglo-American I
l practice, and our Supreme Court of the United States
in cases arising out of the Civil War, have recognized
mt ­ the doctrines of " Continuous Voyage " and " Ulti-
mate Destination," M., a vessel going to a neutral
port, but with an ultimate destination for a blockaded
port, may be seized as a blockade runner, or a cargo
, so destined, even though not contraband, may be y
. confiscated. l
l In the famous case of The Springbok, so much dis- i
cussed, a British vessel going to a British possession, l
namely Nassau, during our Civil War, was seized l
on the ground that her cargo was ultimately destined y
ä l
4 n