HomeThe German chancellor and the outbreak of warPagina 94

JPEG (Deze pagina), 643.32 KB

TIFF (Deze pagina), 5.79 MB

PDF (Volledig document), 76.42 MB

Q2 THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR
standing, as it did, entirely by itself, must ‘
conümn the worst fears of the Russian Govern-
.p _ ment. Glaukos characterises the nature of
K the refusal by calling it a German " Nein ";
T it will not be unfair to say that this in German
. ` parlance means an emphatic and rude nega-
tive. This is precisely what I mean; it was
r not the time to use what he calls a " deutsches
nein," not, that is, if peace was to be preserved.
§ The same formula was sent to Sir Edward
R Grey. He acted quite differently. He saw
F that it would not do, but by recasting it, he
put it in such a form that it might still have
been accepted by either side, and, in fact, was
to a large extent accepted by both sides and
2 agreed to as the basis of discussion. It would
have been perfectly easy for Germany to act
in the same way. She did not do so, and her
_' neglect to do this was, as has been clearly
,l shown, the ünal cause for Russian complete
r mobilisation, Le., for the war?
[ Glaukos, therefore, has to find some other
Q way out of the difficulty. He has to show
g that in some other wa.y there was conveyed
during this day to the Russian Government
a knowledge that Austria was ready to give
*. F. Archer. " The Thirteen Days," p. 136.