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sufficient for him, as it would have been for
the others, to propose or to accept a formula
y for negotiation; he must also stop Russian
rnobilisation, and he could only do this by
removing the cause of it, that is, by persuading
Austria to suspend, at any rate for two or
three days, her military measures.
The merit of Glaukos’ article is that he
recognises this. He sees that in order to
l throw the blame upon Russia it is necessary
‘ to prove that she mobilised, although she
; knew that Austria was prepared to give way
on this essential point. As he says: " Headlam
here comes to the kernel of the problem.
We cannot get clear on the guilt for the war
i until the facts are cleared up. Was Russia,
in the night of the 30th-3rst july still under
the impression of obstinate Austrian refusal
i of all concessions? If the answer is yes,
t then Headlam is right and the Central Powers
must take upon themselves a great portion
of the guilt for the world war. If, however,
iq Russia had good reason during this night
5 of the 30th-3rst definitely to expect that
Austria would give way, then all his con- V
_l siderations collapse miserably."
‘; We come down therefore to the very deiinite
and positive question : What did Russia know