HomeThe German chancellor and the outbreak of warPagina 89

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not an ultimatum and the declaration of
war, but mobilisation. This had been deter- .
mined on in principle as far back as the 25th ·
july, and the mobilisation, preparations for
which had been immediately begun, would .
be made effective immediately supposing that 5
Austria did in fact declare war and begin
military operations. The situation was per- ;
fectly clear. If Austria began the attack
E upon Serbia they could not refrain from i
i making all necessary military preparations. ~
As has been repeatedly pointed out, it was {
quite consistently the declaration of war and g
the bombardment of Belgrade which brought
about the calling out of the reserves on the i
night of july the 29th throughout a large
p portion of the Russian army, and it was quite
l clear that unless Austria officially engaged 2
herself to stop this action the reserves through- F
out the rest of the Empire would immediately
be called to the colours. Now, according to i
2 the Russian and also the Austrian point of ‘
E view, this did not necessarily mean war ; there
ë would still be an opportunity for continuing
negotiations between the two states. According
to the German point of view, however, it
J did mean war. Therefore if the German Chan- q
S cellor wished really to avoid war it was not i

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