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ii T
there is only one way in which he can do so. y
He must produce the communications which
passed from Berlin to Vienna during the first _
portion of the crisis. He has now given us
two telegrams sent during Thursday, the 30th. i
Let us have those telegrams which were sent {
from the time when the Austrian Note to
Serbia was published, and let him show that
his anxiety to keep the peace was as strong
before the possible intervention of Great Britain
became known as it was afterwards. 4
• .
We may sum up this part of the controversy N
by saying:
1. There had at the beginning been a com-
Ei plete agreement between Berlin and Vienna. .
It had been determined that the Note should i
be presented to Serbia in such a form as I
almost inevitably to drive her to war. à
If, as was to be anticipated, Russia threatened ’
to intervene, Germany would use all her efforts
to stop Russia’s intervention (ez) by threats ,i
L of war: (b) by trying to detach France from
ri Russia. If she were successful in this, either
¥ the hostile alliance would be broken up or Q
its weakness as against the Triple Alliance g
gi would be demonstrated, and in either event
‘ the Triple Alliance would emerge from the i
ii _; ,,,,