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versations begun by Russia. No one reading
this document could possibly understand what
g; really happened.
f VVe have, however, still to consider whether
· the Chancellor was not at the same time really T
doing all he could to avoid war. Here, how-
ever, our information fails us, the revelations
.< stop, night falls, and we are again left in
darkness. Will he now continue his revelations
and tell us the secret? It is on this that
', his reputation will depend. It is on the
Tj sequel that it depends whether his action
was a genuine attempt to preserve peace
or a supremely dishonest move to bring about
i a situation in which Russia was obliged to
f mobilise so as to make it possible for Germany
i to mobilise on her side and go to war.
l I wish to put the problem as clearly and
! concisely as possible. The whole question now
’ really turned on mobilisation. The Chancellor
prevented German mobilisation on Wednesday
night and Thursday morning on the ground 1
that Russia had only mobilised against Austria.
, He knew, however, that if Russia mobilised
, against Germany also his hand would be
T forced and he would no longer be able to
keep back the soldiers. If, therefore, he wanted ·_
to preserve peace, he must do all in his power
l, V