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F
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ii AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 51 -
E had themselves referred to these conversations
ä as one of the reasons for rejecting the English
‘ proposal for mediation. i
3 L Now, it appeared that these negotiations
t té had been broken off by Austria. What would
5 be the effect of this as soon as it became
1 . known? Surely it would have been to show
t t that Russian mobilisation was absolutely justi-
fied, and, in fact, unavoidable. She would
t have been driven to it by two simultaneous
1 è acts, the declaration of war on Serbia and
·­ the rupture of negotiations, for both of which
H ç Austria was responsible. Supposing, now, that
J Germany had, as the military party wished, .
1 Yi at once mobilised, Russia could at once have
E Q published the facts, and no sophistry could
*‘ A then have obscured the real situation. The
*· answer would have been crushing. Russia
t , would have said, " We offered to negotiate
d with Austria; you used our offer as a means
d of stopping English proposals for mediation; p
H at the very moment that you were doing this A
d E your ally declared war against Serbia and
·'C broke off the negotiations. What course was
$‘ p open to us except to press on with our military
is Q arrangements and begin mobilisation? But
lS in doing this we had to take into consideration Q
lt that we had been oflicially informed that
D 2
il Q