HomeThe German chancellor and the outbreak of warPagina 45

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` and, by the circular letter to the German A
Q Governments sent on Tuesday, the latter had
been informed that war was probably imminent.
V So far all is intelligible. The action is in
one piece; it can only be explained on the
assumption of a plan which had been drawn T
up beforehand, by which the alternative of
surrender or war would be placed before
E Russia, and this was accompanied by the
i deünite determination to go to war if Russia .
did not surrender. As to the facts and their
' interpretation, there is not and cannot be
any dispute. German writers do not, in fact, T
contest them. What they do is to contest J
the justice of Russia’s claim to be considered i
in the Serbian question. They deny this,
Q and in denying it they adopt and defend
C the position of the German Government that
it would be justiüable to go to war rather
{ than to accept it.
Now, for all this the Chancellor was primarily
responsible. We have to do with a diplomatie
policy which falls under his control. Even
if he had misgivings he did not let them appear.
3 He had deünitely and irrevocably adopted the
_ position that Austria was to go to war with ‘
i Serbia, and that if Russia interfered, Germany j
would at once go to war with her. A