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" But even after mobilisation began Beth-
mann­Hollweg made a last attempt to have
the order withdrawn. Fortunately, it was ‘
then too late. Clear-headed and politically l
far­sighted military authorities had carried '
i their point at the eleventh hour. What those
days of indecision on the Chancellor’s part
really cost us can hardly be estimated. The
important advantage gained by the capability
T of more rapid mobilisation than our enemies
was lost, thanks to Bethmann­Hollweg. What-
ever military advantage also was lost we will
read later between the lines of the reports
y of the General Staff .....
i " If ever there was a time in a decisive
hour when the task of responsible military L
leaders had been rendered nearly impossible
it was before the outbreak of this war, when
Germany faced a right for her very existence,
and that is the fault of her leading statesman.
ii No condemnation can be severe enough for i
_ much unnecessary blood that has been shed,
I due to the policy of this political sleep-
walker ..... i
" The absolute lack of diplomatie prepara-
tion came to light on August 1st, IQI4, by
the fact that no one at the Foreign Ofüce
knew whether the war would be waged on