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l 26 THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR
of the ünal order calling in Russian reserves (
at the particular moment when it was pub-
P lished, was a diplomatie mistake; I say a ,
diplomatie mistake, for it gave to the German ;
Government just the kind of pretext that they
; wanted. Looking back on the series of events k
with our present knowledge, we may, I think,
i suggest that the course of action actually ·
adopted shows the inconvenience which comes
from divided councils. It would, perhaps, ;
E have been wiser if directly the Austrian de-
g claration of war against Serbia was issued
they had at once broken off all negotiations,
issued an ultimatum to Austria and summoned
l the whole of the reserves to the colours.
l I assume that the reason for not doing this
y was a double one: ürst, there was a genuine
l desire on the part of the Czar not to break ‘
off the last faint chance of preserving peace, g
and secondly, it was necessary to wait until
the French President had returned to Paris.
Had they acted in this way on ¥Vednesday,
they would have had a full and complete
justification. What they did was to have
recourse to a half measure. This put them I
into an awkward position; as I attempt to e
show the events of Thursday really took away
the last reasons which had indueed the Czar
l
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