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p’ AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 15
could not have been taken except as the result
of a carefully thought out plan.
` I say that Russian mobilisation was the
à natural and inevitable consequence of a de-
claration of war by Austria against Serbia.
The justification of this view lies outside the
history of the Twelve Days, and it requires
a study of the whole relations between Russia
and Austria and the Balkans during the last
ISO years. The situation that arose in IQI4
` was one to which there are many precedents,
and in all of them we find the general idea
that a struggle between the two great Christian
Empires for control over the Slavonic peoples,
A who had formerly been incorporated in the
Turkish Empire, could only be avoided by
the establishment of a general agreement be-
tween them. For such an agreement two
elements were necessary. The first was that
P neither of these Empires should take any
strong forward step without a preliminary
discussion with its rival, by which the con-
ditions and the limitations of its action should
be defined. The second was that there should
be some kind of agreed partition of interests ;
this would naturally take the form that the
Western Balkans should be assigned to Austria,
the Eastern to Russia ; obviously the ultimate