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« I4 THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR
. I should put it differently. Russia determined R
i 0n mobilisation, not on the 2gth or 30th, but A
J 011 the 25th. At the Council summoned 011 f
_? that day, the decision was made that if
E Austria, as she threatened to do, declared
war upon a11d attached Serbia, the Russian
J; reserves would be immediately called to the
i Colours. The Russian Government have put
Qi the n1atter quite fairly. The Czar, in a tele-
gl'3.1'I1 sent on july 30th, explained that the
mobilisation then being carried out was only
; the conclusion of measures detern1ined upon
Q five days ago. The question then which arises
ii on the 29th a11d the 30th is not whether Russia p
was right in making a fresh decision at this
i time, but whether a11ything had happened
' to induce her to alter a decision already made.
The onus of proof rests not on St. Petersburg
but on Vienna a11d Berlin. They knew of
the Russia11 decision; a11d this decisio11 was »
·’ tl1e necessary result of their own action. Could
they bring forward any reasonable grounds
for altering it? All this German contro-
A versialists ignore; they nialce light of the
Austrian ultiniatum to Serbia; they pass
{ over hastily tl1e first days of tl1e crisis, but,
as I read it, all that followed was the inevitable
y result of this first fatal step, a step which
H `