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made war inevitable, but the action of the i
German Government. -
§ It is now evident that the mobilisation of
the Russian army, the mobilisation of the
British Heet, and the warning addressed to
the German Government did in fact, in com-
A bination, for the first time make a peaceful
issue of the crisis possible, for they opened
the eyes of the German Chancellor to the
dangers of the policy on which he had em-
? barked, and they were followed by the ürst
· concession on the part of the Austro-Hungarian p
p Government. Even at this stage it might p
A have been possible to preserve peace. But
the Chancellor, though he was in possession A
i of the compliance of his ally, though he had
Q A now got the consent of Austria to the principle
I of mediation, never passed this on to the i
other countries. If Austria, after Russian
_j mobilisation, was willing to accept arbitration
x or mediation, it was the obvious and imperative ·
nl duty of the Chancellor, with the least possible “
delay, to communicate this decision to the
i Russian and British Governments, and to l
de have asked for the acceptance of this. Instead
* of doing so, there was sent to Russia an
« ultimatum so worded that it could not be
accepted, and no answer was made to the