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of any concession on these points, but they
did show that even if Russia mobilised, there
was still a chance of peace if negotiations
were conüned to Austria and Russia, and ~
’ were based on a consideration of the ünal
settlement after a victory had been won over
g From Austria, therefore, there was nothing ’
g which seemed to make it desirable or necessary ,
_ to postpone mobilisation.
. From London she heard of this proposal, but
; it is doubtful whether the information arrived
­ i early in the morning of the 31st or late at p
­ night on the 30th. In either case the news I
5 p came too late to have any effect upon her
l y action, and it was not confirmed by any news `
5 g u from Berlin.
; " I maintain, then, that Russia was throughout
g V the whole of the 3otH in the presence of obstinate
lg refusal by Austria of all concessions, and I
t therefore call on Glaukos to accept the corollary
I which he has himself indicated, and to allow
eg that the Central Powers have a large share
_­ I in the guilt for the outbrealq of the war. l
.- 1 ïï
n I As the German Chancellor and Glaukos _,
h have referred to the Austrian telegram, (A. 51), it
n f seems desirable to point out the real truth