HomeThe German chancellor and the outbreak of warPagina 109

JPEG (Deze pagina), 610.05 KB

TIFF (Deze pagina), 5.67 MB

PDF (Volledig document), 76.42 MB

truth 110 hope, that military considerations
were still dominant?
How great is the contrast when we turn to
. England. Here we ünd nothing of this lethargy
A and hesitancy. Sir Edward Grey kept the
Russian Government informed of what was
going on. On this Glaukos is right, but he _
T does not see, or he omits to point out, how ä
damaging is the comparison to his own cause. «»
On ]uly 30th, after he had received a favour-
able answer from Berlin and had seen the
ï German Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey tele-
graphed to Sir George Buchanan, rehearsed
the proposal, and added to it the following: ,
" If Austria (accepts this suggestion), I hope
A that Russia would also consent to a discussion `
and suspension of further military prepara­
tions, provided that other Powers do the
. same." (B. 103).
It has been said that England did not press `
Russia to suspend her mobilisation. This is
untrue. She did so, but she did so in such 5
i a form as to make it easy for Russia to agree.
To ask Russia to promise this while Austria i
l continued to make war and to mobilise was
T an insult. This is what the German Emperor
did. Had Germany on the same day, as
she easily might have, sent a message to Russia