HomeThe second year of the warPagina 22

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gr l
This double offensive in the West,
Q though it failed to achieve its main
E object, had three considerable conse- T
E quences. It compelled the enemy to
ä increase the number of effectives he was
l keeping upon the Western line; much L
$ more important, it showed that the deep j
digging and the whole system of the
enemy’s defensive was useless against F
intensive fire, and that with that advan­
l tage one found him surrendering readily,
and if anything less fit for the strain
y than his opponents. Thirdly, and much ;
the most important of all, the failure I
taught both sides lessons, which the ï
enemy was to apply later at Verdun, and
the Allies in a far more developed form
in the great attack delivered upon the
Somme nine months later.
Roughly speaking, these lessons were
as follows :
mom snnmls mannen. ·
It had been proved that one great hammer
blow against a line thoroughly held and
indeünitely munitioned would not succeed
in breaking that line. The method for
the future against equal armament must
be a method of continued application,